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in 
JURISDICTION 
Original jurisdiction of this appeal was vested in the Utah Supreme Court pursuant 
to the provisions of UCA §78-2-2(3)(j). The Utah Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction 
pursuant to the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
IV 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for 
a directed verdict claiming that only one half (1/2) of the water rights sold to the 
Watrouses by the Kings passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death? 
(Record 1131-1138, 1154-1164). 
Standard of Review: On appeal from a directed verdict, the appellate court must 
examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. 
Gourdin v. SharonTs Cultural Edu. Recreational Assoc. 845 P.2d 242 (Utah 1992), citing 
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines. 652 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1982). 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion For Relief Pursuant 
To Rule 60(b) URCP? (Record 1177-1188, 1201-1206). 
Standard of Review: A Rule 60(b) motion is reviewed under an abuse of 
VI 
discretion. Ostler v. Buhler. 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998), quoting Larsen v. Collina 
684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984). 
V 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
Art. Vm, Sec. 5, Utah Constitution: 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other 
courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed 
originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the 
court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
STATUTES: 
UCA §78-2-2(3)0): 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(j): 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
RULES: 
Rule 4 URAP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 1(a) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
vn 
Rule 6(a) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 6(e) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 58A(d) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 59 URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
Rule 60(b) URCP: This Rule is reproduced in the Appendix. 
viii 
VI 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's grant of a directed verdict, in favor of the 
Kings, ruling that only one-half of the water rights sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, 
passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond Watrous5 death and an appeal of the 
trial court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion asking the trial court to vacate 
its grant of a directed verdict in favor of the Kings, ruling that only one-half of the water 
rights sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond Watrous' death, so that Mr. Henshaw could appeal that part of the trial court's 
grant of a directed verdict in favor of the Kings ruling that only one half of the water 
rights sold to the Watrouses by the Kings passed to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond Watrous' death. 
B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Henshaws filed suit against Jack King alleging causes for 1) Breach of 
Contract, 2) Tortuous Interference, 3) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fan-
Dealing, 4) Theft or Conversion, 5) Harassment, and 6) Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress on July 14, 2000. The Henshaws filed an Amended Complaint 
asserting the same causes of action on August 22, 2003, and added Bonnie King as a 
defendant. Various motions were filed and several orders were entered by the trial court 
regarding those motions. This matter went to trial before a jury on April 17, 2006. 
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On April 19, 2006, at the close of the plaintiffs' case, the Kings moved for a 
directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs 
in the case and dismissing several of the Henshaw's claims. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara 
Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's 
claims for intentional interference with economic relations, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, conversion or theft. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that, at 
most, Mr. Henshaw could only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the 
Watrouses, by the Kings, because the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did 
not specify that it was a conveyance as joint tenants rather than tenants in common and 
there was no evidence that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon 
his death. 
Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the sole 
plaintiff and assert his claims that he had an easement to connect his three-inch waterline 
to the Kings' six-inch waterline, to use the six-inch waterline to water his property, and 
that the Kings did in fact sell water rights to the Watrouses which water rights were sold 
to Barbara Henshaw and then to Mr. Henshaw. 
At conclusion of the trial the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use 
the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to him by the Warranty 
Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to him.1 
1. The jury concluded that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled to use the water the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw because he failed to file a change application with the 
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However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold water rights to the Watrouses and 
that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty Deeds from 
Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to Dee Henshaw and 
determined that the Kings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted in 
themselves. 
The Kings prepared an Order On Motions For Directed Verdict, (hereinafter, "the 
Order") and sent a copy of "the Order55 to Mr. Henshaw5 s counsel on or about May 4, 
2006. Mr. Henshaw5s counsel objected to "the Order55 on May 15, 2006. However, that 
objection was not entered on the trial court's docket until May 18, 2006. Nonetheless, the 
Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May 15, 2006. The Kings5 
counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw5s objection to 'the Order55 on or about May 18, 2006. 
(Record 1191-1194). That response was filed with the trial court on May 22, 2006. 
The trial court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw5s objection to "the 
Order55 on June 19, 2006. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated 
that it had signed and entered "the Order55 on May 15, 2006. Neither the Kings nor their 
counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a "Notice of Judgment55 on "the Order55 as 
required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. See the Judgment Roll and Index for this matter. 
Upon learning that the trial court had signed and entered "the Order55 on May 15, 
2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming 
that the trial court had improperly signed and entered "the Order55 because the time for 
Division of Water Rights that is a prerequisite to using any water when the point of use is 
changed. However, as Kirk Forbush testified, the failure of the Henshaws to file the change 
application did not invalidate the sale of the water. (Record 1126-1127). 
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him to file an objection to "the Order" had not yet expired. This Motion was filed on 
July 27, 2006. 
On September 13, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter or 
Amend based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not binding 
on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rules 59, it could not extend the time 
to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. 
On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw then filed a Motion For Relief Under Rule 
60(b), asking the trial court to set aside "the Order", claiming that the Kings deliberately 
failed to notify him that the "the Order" had been entered and responded to his Objection 
to "the Order" in order to prevent him from learning that "the Order" had been entered in 
time to file an appeal from "the Order". 
On November 15, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision denying 
Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b) holding that Mr. Henshaw was not 
sufficiently diligent in determining if "the Order" 
had in fact been signed and entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not 
binding on district courts. 
Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006. 
C 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about July 1992, Barbara Henshaw purchased certain real property, 
located in Wayne County, Utah from Mildred Watrous. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 
789-821). 
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2. In conjunction with said purchase of real property, Barbara Henshaw also 
purchased water rights to irrigate the referenced property, which rights had previously 
been purchased by Mildred and Raymond Watrous from Jack and Bonnie King 
(hereinafter the Kings"). (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
3. The water deed given to the Watrouses by the Kings specified that the Kings 
were selling two hours of the full flow of Pine Creek every eighteen days. (Record 1-16, 
467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
4. The language of the Water Deed was incorporated into the Warranty Deed 
given Barbara Henshaw by Mildred Watrous at the closing of the purchase of the 
property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
5. Dee Henshaw completed the purchase of the property from his mother Barbara 
Henshaw and recorded a deed to the property on August 14, 2003. However, prior to that 
time he had an unrecorded deed from Barbara Henshaw conveying the referenced 
property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
6. From the time the Watrouses purchased the water rights, until approximately 
June 1, 2000, both the Watrouses and the Henshaws used the water as needed on a daily 
basis without any objection or complaint from the Kings about how much water was 
being used or how the water was being used. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
7. From the time the Henshaws purchased the property in 1992, through June 
20O0, the Kings never shut off the Henshaws' water. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 
789-821). 
8. Beginning on or about June 1, 2000, the Kings began interfering with the 
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Henshaws' use of their water on a daily basis by shutting off the Henshaws' water. 
(Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
9. Additionally the Kings made calls to the Henshaws threatening to shut off the 
Henshaws' water, dig up their waterline and otherwise prevent the Henshaws' from using 
the water to irrigate their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
10. Sometime shortly after June 28, 2000, without first telling the Henshaws, the 
Kings placed a lA inch pipe and Vi inch gate valve on the 3-inch waterline. The 3-inch 
waterline was installed and paid for by the Watrouses, and it was sold to the Henshaws 
by Mildred Watrous. King installed the lA inch pipe and the Vi inch gate valve for the 
express purpose of preventing the Henshaws from being able to use the water to operate 
their hand lines and sprinklers to water their property. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 
789-821). 
11. From the time the Kings installed the V2 inch pipe and gate valve on the 3-
inch waterline, installed and paid for by the Watrouses and sold to the Henshaws, the 
Henshaws were denied access to the water they purchased from Mildred Watrous, who, 
along with her Husband Raymond, purchased the water rights from Jack and Bonnie 
King. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
12. On July 14, 2000, Barbara Henshaw, Dee Henshaw and Dana Henshaw filed 
suit against Jack King for: Breach of Contract, Tortuous Interference, Breach of Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, Theft or Conversion, Harassment, and Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. (Record 1-16, 467-481, 738-755, 789-821). 
13. King filed an answer claiming that he never sold the Watrouses any water 
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rights and a counterclaim to quiet title to the water that the Henshaws claim he sold to the 
Watrouses that the Watrouses then sold to them. (Record 24-31). 
14. In his answer, King also claimed that Mildred could only sell one half of the 
water that the Kings sold to her and her Husband because the Water Deed given to the 
Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that the water was sold to the Watrouses as joint 
tenants rather than as tenants in common. (Record 24-31). 
15. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Bonnie King as a defendant 
on August 22, 2003. (Record 467-481). 
16. The Kings filed an answer to the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on 
September 10, 2003. (Record 486-494). 
17. On June 7, 2004, the Kings filed an amended answer and counterclaim 
asserting the same defenses as Jack King did in his answer to the plaintiffs' initial 
Complaint and added a claim for "quiet title." (Record 646-653). 
18. Various motions were subsequently filed by both parties and the case went to 
trial before Judge Lee on April 17, 2006. (Record 988-994). 
19. After the close of the plaintiffs' case, on April 19, 2006, the Kings moved for 
a motion for a directed verdict seeking a dismissal of Barbara Henshaw and Dana 
Henshaw as plaintiffs in the case. (Record 1068-1072). 
20. Judge Lee dismissed Barbara Henshaw and Dana Henshaw as plaintiffs in the 
case and he dismissed Mr. Henshaw's claims for intentional interference with economic 
relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress, conversion or theft. (Record 1068-
1072). 
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21. Judge Lee also granted the Kings' claim that, at most, Mr. Henshaw could 
only acquire one-half interest in the water sold to the Watrouses, by the Kings, because 
the Water Deed given the Watrouses by the Kings did not specify that it was a 
conveyance as joint tenants, rather than tenants in common, and there was no evidence 
that Mrs. Watrous acquired Mr. Watrous interest in the water upon his death. (Record 
1088-1094, 1068-1072). 
22. Judge Lee then permitted the trial to go forward with Mr. Henshaw as the 
sole plaintiff. Mr. Henshaw was permitted to assert his claims that he had an easement to 
connect the three-inch waterline to the Kings' six-inch waterline, to use the six-inch 
waterline to water his property, and that the Kings sold water rights to the Watrouses, 
which rights were later sold to Barbara Henshaw and then sold to Mr. Henshaw. (Record 
1098-1094). 
23. At conclusion of the trial, the jury found that Mr. Henshaw was not entitled 
to use the water the Kings had sold to the Watrouses and conveyed to Mr. Henshaw by 
the Warranty Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara 
Henshaw to Dee Henshaw. (Record 1011-1012). 
24. However, the jury found that Kings had in fact sold water rights to the 
Watrouses and that those water rights were transferred to Mr. Henshaw by the Warranty 
Deeds from Mildred Watrous to Barbara Henshaw and from Barbara Henshaw to Dee 
Henshaw and determined that the ICings were not entitled to have the water rights quieted 
in themselves. (Record 1011-1012). 
25. The Kings prepared "the Order" and sent a copy of "the Order" to Mr. 
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Henshaw's counsel on or about May 4, 2006. (Record 1068-1072). 
26. Mr. Henshaw's counsel objected to "the Order" on May 15, 2006. (Record 
1075-1078). 
27. However, that objection was not entered until May 18, 2006. (Record 1075-
1078). 
28. Nonetheless, the Kings admit that the Objection was served on them on May 
15,2006. (Record 1091-1099). 
29. The Kings' counsel responded to Mr. Henshaw's objection to "the Order" on 
or about May 18, 2006. (Record 1209-1214). That response was filed with the trial court 
on May 22, 2006. (Record 1091-1099). 
30. The trial court issued a memorandum decision on Mr. Henshaw's objection to 
"the Order" on June 19, 2006. (Record 1125-1130). 
31. In the trial court's Memorandum Decision, the trial court stated that it had 
signed and entered "the Order" on May 15, 2006. (Record 1125-1130). 
32. This was the first time either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel learned that the trial 
court had signed and entered "the Order." (Record 1172). 
33. Neither the Kings nor their counsel ever sent Mr. Henshaw or his counsel a 
"Notice of Judgment" on "the Order" as required by Rule 58a(d) URCP. (Record 1131-
1138), see also, the Judgment Roll and Index. 
34. Upon learning that the trial court had signed and entered "the Order" on May 
15, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion to Alter or Amend under Rule 59 URCP, claiming 
that the trial court had improperly signed and entered "the Order," because the time for 
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him to file an objection to "the Order" had not expired at the time the trial court signed 
and entered "the Order." This Motion was filed on July 27, 2006. (Record 1131-1138). 
35. On September 13, 2006, the trial court denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion to Alter 
or Amend, based on its conclusions that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not 
binding on district courts, and that under the provisions of Rule 59, it could not extend 
the time to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment or order. (Record 1171-1174). 
36. On September 28, 2006, Mr. Henshaw filed a Motion For Relief Under Rule 
60(b), asking the trial court to set aside that part of "the Order," ruling that Mildred 
Watrous did not acquire title to the water the Kings sold her and her husband, Raymond, 
at the time of Raymond's death and claiming that the Kings deliberately failed to notify 
him that "the Order" had been entered and responded to his Objection to "the Order" for 
the purpose of preventing him from learning that "the Order" had been entered in time to 
file an appeal from "the Order". (Record 1175-1176). 
37. On November 15, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision 
denying Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Relief Under Rule 60(b), stating that Mr. Henshaw 
was not sufficiently diligent in determining if "the Order" had in fact been signed and 
entered and that the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP are not binding on district courts. 
(Record 1209-1214). 
38. Mr. Henshaw filed his Notice of Appeal on December 16, 2006. (Record 
1215-1216). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the 
Kings' motion for a directed verdict, claiming that only one-half of the water rights they 
sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. The 
trial court also committed prejudicial and reversible error, and abused its discretion, when 
it failed to set aside that portion of its directed verdict holding that only one-half of the 
water rights they sold to the Watrouses passed to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond 
Watrous' death. 
vra 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT GRANTED THE KINGS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, 
CLAIMING THAT ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO 
THE WATROUSES PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND 
WATROUS'S DEATH. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED 
TO SET ASIDE THAT PORTION OF ITS DIRECTED VERDICT HOLDING THAT 
ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES 
PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS'S DEATH. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT GRANTED THE KINGS' MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
CLAIMING THAT ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO 
THE WATROUSES PASSED TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND 
WATROUS'S DEATH. 
A. Marshaling Of Facts: 
The trial court made no factual findings to support its ruling that Raymond 
Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses 
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did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. In his Motion to Alter 
or Amend, Mr. Henshaw specifically asked the trial court to enter factual findings so the 
appeals courts could understand how the trial court determined that the Kings had 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights 
the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond 
Watrous' death. (Record 1154-1156). However, the trial court failed to do so. 
Therefore, there are no facts for Mr. Henshaw to martial to support the trial court's ruling 
that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights the Kings sold to the 
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. (Record 
1171-1174). 
B. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That Raymond Watrous' 
Interest In, Or Ownership Of, The Water Rights The Kings Sold To The Watrouses Did 
Not Pass To Mildred Watrous Upon Raymond Watrous' Death. 
Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings do not have standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, the water rights they sold to the 
Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Therefore, 
the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error when it granted the Kings' 
motion for a directed verdict ruling that Raymond Watrous' interest in, or ownership of, 
the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond Watrous' death and ultimately to Mr. Henshaw. 
In Sierra Club v. Dept. Of Environmental Quality, Div. Of Solid & Hazardous 
Waste, 857 P.2d 982 (Utah, 1993) the Utah Supreme Court declared that: "The first and 
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most widely used standard to show standing requires a plaintiff to show some distinct 
palpable injury that gives rise to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute. " Citing 
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). (Emphasis added). In Wright v. 
Carver 886 P.2d 58; (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court, citing Shelledy v. Lore. 836 
P.2d 786 (Utah 1992) again stated: "(third-party standing rule requires litigants to assert 
their own legal rights and does not allow them to claim relief on the legal rights or 
interests of third parties). " 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) the U.S. Supreme 
Court stated: [TJhe core component of standing requires, among other things, that "the 
plaintiff must have suffered an 'injury infacf" and that the injury is "actual or imminent 
not conjectural or hypothetical" (quotations and citation omitted)). This holding was 
cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. Jorgensen. 2006 UT App 168 2006 P.3d 
(2006 UT App 168). 
In Washington City. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan 82 P.3d 1125 (Utah 
20O3) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
A plaintiff who has not been granted standing to sue by statute must either show 
that he has or would suffer a "distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a 
personal stake in the outcome" of the case or meet one of the two exceptions to 
standing recognized in cases involving "importantpublic issues. 
In Council of Holladav City v. Mayor Dennis Larkin. 89 P.3d 164 (Utah 2004) the 
Utah Supreme Court declared: "Our law on standing requires that a [pjlaintiffmust be 
able to show that he has suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives him a 
personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. " 
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In Havmond v. Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), the 
Utah Supreme Court again discussed the applicable standards for standing in Utah. In 
Bonneville, the Supreme Court stated: 
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has 
sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, the injury 
and the cause of action being contemporaneous." 1A CJ.S. Actions § 32a 
(1985); Jenkins v. Swan, ti/5 1\ l*i "45, 1148 (Utah 1983). In matters of 
great public importance, we have employed other tests to evaluate whether 
a plaintiff should be allowed to pursue a lawsuit where he has sustained no 
injury. Standing may be found if the matter is of great public importance, if 
the plaintiff, although lacking a distinct injury is in as good a position to 
challenge the alleged illegality as any other potential plaintiff, and if the 
issue is unlikely to ever be raised if the plaintiff is denied standing to sue. 
Jenkins, 675 P. 2d at 1150. 
None of the potential heirs, devisees or creditors of Raymond Watrous ever 
claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water, and/or the water rights, did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Because none of the potential heirs, 
devisees or creditors of Raymond Watrous ever claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest 
in the water, and/or the water rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond 
Watrous' death, the Kings are required to show that they have standing, on their own, to 
assert that Mildred Watrous did not acquire all of Raymond Watrous' right, title and 
interest in the water, and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses, at the time of 
Raymond's death. And they must also show that they have standing, on their own, to 
claim that she did not, or could not, convey all of the right, title and interest in the water, 
and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses, by the Kings, to Barbara Henshaw and 
ultimately to Dee Henshaw. The Kings did not do that, and they cannot do that. 
The Kings have not claimed that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water, and/or 
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the water rights, passed to them, or should have passed to them, at the time of Raymond 
Watrous5 death. The Kings have not claimed that they are heirs, devisees or creditors that 
were entitled to make a claim against the estate of Raymond Watrous. Therefore, in 
order for them to even assert that any right, title and interest in the water and/or the water 
rights deeded to Raymond Watrous by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond Watrous5 death, the Kings have to prove that they have independent standing to 
make such an assertion or that they have standing to make such an assertion on the part of 
an heir, devisee or creditor of the estate of Raymond Watrous. Furthermore, they had to 
prove that they had standing to make such a claim at the time they asked the trial court for 
a directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous5 interest in the water, and/or the water 
rights, did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of his death. They did not do so, and 
they cannot do so. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Raymond Watrous5 V2 interest in the water, did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, it did not pass to the Kings, and the 
Kings have no standing, in this proceeding, to claim that Raymond Watrous5 Vi interest in 
the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous5 death. Whether 
Raymond's V2 interest in the water passed lA to Mildred and 1/8 to each of his two 
children, 1/6 to Mildred and 1/6 to each of his two children or passed to them in some other 
percentage, it is irrelevant in this proceeding. 
Whatever happened to Mr. Watrous5 lA of the water, it did not pass to the Kings, 
and the Kings have no standing to assert possible claims to the ownership of the water, or 
water rights, on the part of Mr. Watrous5 children or any other person or entity in this 
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proceeding. Likewise they have no standing to assert a claim that Raymond Watrous' V* 
interest in the water, did not pass to Mildred Watrous on behalf of the public at large. 
The Kings have not, and cannot, show any legal or equitable interest in 
Raymond's lA interest in the water. The Kings have not, and cannot, show that they will 
be harmed or prejudiced in any way whatsoever if Raymond's V2 interest in the water, 
passed to Mildred Watrous rather than to some other person or entity. The Kings have 
not, and cannot, show any significant public interest in the ownership of the water, that 
would give them standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond's Vi interest in the water 
in the interest of the public at large. 
Because the Kings cannot "show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise 
to a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute, " Sierra Club, supra, or great public 
interest that would give them standing to even assert a claim in this proceeding that 
Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in the water, or water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous upon Raymond's death, under clear and indisputable Utah law, the Kings do not 
have standing to litigate the issue of the disposition of Raymond Watrous' V2 ownership 
of the water in this action. 
Because the trial court improperly and unlawfully assumed that the Kings had 
standing to litigate the disposition of Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in, or ownership of, 
the water the Kings sold to the Watrouses in this proceeding, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict with respect to the 
Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' V2 interest in the water, or water rights, did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
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Because the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting the Kings' motion for a 
directed verdict with respect to the Kings' claim that Mr. Henshaw had to prove that all 
right title and interest of Raymond Watrous' in the water and/or water rights, passed to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, this Court must reverse the trial court's 
ruling granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict and dismiss the Kings' claim that 
Raymond's Watrous' interest in the water and/or water rights, deeded to the Watrouses 
by the Kings, did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, as that 
ruling by the trial court is plain error. 
POINT n 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S RULE 60b 
MOTION. 
A, Marshaling Of Facts: The trial court made the following factual findings upon which 
it relied in denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion: 
1. The plaintiffs claim they did not receive proper notice of entry of the judgment 
from the defendants as required by Rule 58A(d). 
2. In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to 
learn about entry of the judgment, therefore, the Court concludes that the 
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment 
had been entered. 
3. Similarly, the only evidence the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they 
were misled to believe that the judgment had been entered in this case is the 
plaintiffs' statement that the defendants responded to their objections to the 
proposed order instead of notifying them about entry of the order and judgment. 
4. The case file shows that <(the Order" and the Judgment were signed and 
entered by the Court on 15 May 2006. 
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5. The plaintiffs signed their objections to the proposed order and judgment on 15 
May 2006, and they were received by the Court on 18, May 2006. 
6. The defendants' Reply to the plaintiffs Objections was signed on 19 May 2006; 
and stamped by the clerk 22 May 2006. 
7. Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants 
counsel knew about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and 
mailed the Reply. 
8. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel 
for the defendants had actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed 
to notify the plaintiffs about it. 
9. Thus, the Court finds that the plaintiffs have failed to produce facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that they were diligent in trying to learn about entry of the judgment 
or that they were actually misled to believe that no judgment had been entered. 
It is true that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel contacted the clerk of the trial 
court to specifically determine if "the Order" had been signed and entered. However, 
given the facts of this case and the procedural history, with respect to rulings on motions, 
objections, and requests, etc., as more fully explained infra in this brief, it was not 
unreasonable for either Mr. Henshaw or his counsel to conclude that "the Order5' would 
not be signed and entered prior to the expiration of the time for Mr. Henshaw to object to 
"the Order" or that the trial court would rule on Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" 
in less than a month's time. The trial court never ruled on any motion, objection or 
request in less than a month, other than on this occasion. See the Judgment Roll and 
Index for this matter. 
The trial court is also technically correct is stating that the only direct evidence 
"the plaintiffs advance in an attempt to prove they were misled to believe that the 
judgment had been entered in this case is the plaintiffs' statement that the defendants 
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responded to their objections to the proposed order instead of notifying them about entry 
of the order and judgment However, there is substantial indirect and circumstantial 
evidence that the Kings knew that "the Order" had both been signed and entered. As set 
forth, infra, in greater detail, the Kings have not denied that they knew "the Order" had 
been signed and entered, and that they deliberately failed to notify Mr. Henshaw of that 
fact as required by Rule 58A(d) URCP. 
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion And Committed Prejudicial And Reversible 
Error When It Denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60b Motion. 
Mr. Henshaw has a Constitutional right to appeal trial courts' directed verdict, 
holding that Raymond Watrous' Vi interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the 
Kings did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death. Art. VIII Sec. 
5. Utah Constitution, provides that: "From all final judgments of the district courts, there 
shall be a right of appeal to the Supreme Court " C.G. Horman co. v. Lloyd: 28 Utah 2d 
112, P.2d 124 (1972). Rule 4 URAP also provides Mr. Henshaw the right to appeal "the 
Directed Verdict/5 
The trial court denied Mr. Henshaw his right to appeal its directed verdict, holding 
that Raymond Watrous' Vi interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the Kings did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond Watrous' death, when it denied Mr. 
Henshaw's Rule 60b Motion asking the trial court to vacate its directed verdict to permit 
him to appeal that portion of the directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' V2 
interest in the water sold to the Watrouses by the Kings did not pass to Mildred Watrous 
upon Raymond Watrous' death. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60b 
Motion Based On Its Legal Conclusion That Rule 1(f)(1) URCP Is Not Binding On Trial 
Courts. 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP provides: "Objections to the proposed order shall be filed 
within five days after service. " In pertinent part, Rule 6(a) URCP provides: 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these 
rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, 
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or 
allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), is 
less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
excluded in the computation. 
In pertinent part, Rule 6(e) URCP provides: 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is 
required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after 
the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served 
upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as 
calculated under subsection (a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be 
included in the computation of any 3-day period under this subsection, except that 
if the, last day nfthe 3-day period is a Saturday a Sundays or a legal hnlida)?i thp 
period shall run until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a 
legal holiday. 
The Kings filed "the Order" with the trial court on or about May 4, 2006, and also 
allegedly mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006. (Record 1129). Because 
the Kings mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006, the first day from which 
to calculate Mr. Henshaw's time to object to "the Order" began on Friday, May 5, 2006. 
Because May 6 was a Saturday and May 7 was Sunday, those days are not counted as 
part of the five days Mr. Henshaw had to object to "the Order." Therefore, the second 
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day of Mr. Henshaw's five days to respond to "the Order" was May 8, 2006, and the five 
days expired on May 11, 2006. 
Because the Kings mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw, under the provisions of 
Rule 6(e), Mr. Henshaw had an additional three days to file any objections to the Kings5 
proposed "the Order." Adding three days to the five days permitted under Rule 6 (a) 
results in Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" becoming due on Sunday, May 14, 
2006, and because the last day on which Mr. Henshaw could file his Objections to "the 
Order" was a Sunday, under the provisions of Rule 6 (e), Mr. Henshaw had until the end 
of the day on Monday, May 15, 2006 to file his Objections to "the Order." 
Because Mr. Henshaw had until the end of the day on May 15, 2006 to file his 
objections to "the Order," the Kings were not entitled to submit "the Order" to the trial 
court, for signature and entry, until May 16, 2006, at the earliest. Rule 7(f)(2) URCP 
further provides: The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being 
served with an objection or the expiration of the time to object. (Emphasis added). 
The Kings claim that they mailed "the Order" to Mr. Henshaw on May 4, 2006. 
Therefore, it is an undisputed that when the applicable URCP are applied to this case, the 
trial court was not legally entitled to execute "the Order" until May 16, 2006 at the 
earliest, and the Kings were not entitled to even submit "the Order" to the trial court for 
signature until May 16, 2006 at the earliest. The trial court signed and entered "the 
Order" on May 15, 2006, prior to the time for Mr. Henshaw to respond to "the Order" 
had expired. 
In Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc., v. Fifth District Court. 933 P.2d 1011, (Utah 1997), 
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the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when the Fifth District Court entered an order 
forfeiting a bond, before the time expired permitting execution on the bond, the order 
permitting execution upon the bond must be set aside. The Court stated: 
In both cases, however, bond was ordered forfeited before ninety days had elapsed 
from the notice of entry of judgment upon the bail Section 77--20a-2(2) makes 
clear that "[ejxecution on a judgment upon the bail may not issue in less than 90 
days after the completion of the mailing or service of a notice of entry of judgment 
upon the surety." Thus, the trial court prematurely ordered the bonds forfeited 
before the statutory time for execution on the bond. The order of execution is 
therefore set aside. 
The reasoning and holding of Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc., is directly relevant and applicable 
to this case. Because it is undisputed that the trial court entered "the Order" before the 
time permitted for Mr. Henshaw to object to "the Order" had expired, under the holding 
and reasoning of Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc., "the Order," that was prematurely entered, 
must be vacated. 
The trial court cited to Tolboe Construction Co., v. Staker Paving and 
Construction Co., 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984) in its denial of Mr. Henshaw5 s Rule 60b 
Motion, claiming that courts are not bound by the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP. 
However, the version of Rule 2.9 FRCP reviewed in Tolboe, and in effect in 1982, is 
substantially different from the present 7(f)(2) URCP applicable in this case. As the 
Tolboe court stated: 
The rule requires first that a copy of the documents be served upon opposing 
counsel before the said documents are presented to the court for signature.... 
The rule's only other requirement is that the notice of objection to the said 
documents be submitted to both the court and counsel within five days after 
service. (Emphasis added). 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP also provides: 'The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or the expiration of the time to 
object. " (Emphasis added). Therefore, it is indisputable that the Kings were not even 
-22-
entitled to submit "the Order" to the trial court for signature until the time for Mr. 
Henshaw to object to "the Order" had expired. Furthermore, in Tolboe the court 
considered and ruled on the objections before the time to appeal had expired. In this case 
the trial court ruled on Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" after the time to appeal 
"the Order" had expired. Additionally, the holding of Tolboe was tacitly overruled in 
Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc., supra. 
In Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[TJhe demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure 
and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." 
Ruppv: Grantsville City, 610P.2d338, 341 (Utah 1980). One of the fundamental 
requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard. Worrall v. Ogden 
City Fire Dept, 616P.2d598, 601 (Utah 1980). 
Clearly in this case the entry of "the Order" prior to the expiration of the time for Mr. 
Henshaw to object to "the Order" constitutes a denial of Mr. Henshaw's "opportunity to 
be fully heard'' as mandated in Wiscombe. Thus the premature signing and entry of "the 
Order" denied Mr. Henshaw his 'fundamental" due process right to the uopportunity to 
be fully heard" on his objections to "the Order" and appeal "the Order" as mandated in 
Wiscombe. 
The premature execution and filing of "the Order" on May 15, 2006, was invalid 
and denied Mr. Henshaw his due process and equal protection rights. Therefore, this 
Court must enter an order vacating "the Order". 
P . The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60B 
Motion Based On Conclusion That Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent Enough In 
Determining Whether Or Not "the Order" Had Been Entered. 
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It is undisputed that the Kings had a legal obligation under the express provisions 
of Rule 58(A)(d) to inform Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" had been signed and entered. 
Mr. Henshaw did not fail to "keep himself informed of the court proceedings, " as the 
Kings falsely claim and the trial court concluded. Rather, the Kings engaged in a scheme 
designed to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that "the Order" and been signed and 
entered. 
Rule 58A(d) URCP provides: 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment A copy of the signed judgment shall be 
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The 
time for fling a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this 
provision. 
However, rather than informing Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" had been signed and 
entered, the Kings responded to Mr. Henshaw's Objections to "the Order." The Kings 
did so to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that the Directed Verdict had been signed 
and entered. 
1, The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial and Reversible Error In Concluding 
That Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent In Determining If the Order On Directed 
Verdicts Had Been Entered. 
In denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion the trial court made the following 
factual finding: 
3. In this case, the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating any efforts to 
learn about entry of the judgment, Therefore, the Court concludes that the 
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment 
had been entered. 
It is true that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel specifically contacted the trial court to 
determine if "the Order" had been entered. However, given the facts of this case, there 
was no reason for either Mr. Henshaw or his attorney to assume that the trial court had 
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signed and entered "the Order" or to even assume that the Kings had improperly 
submitted "the Order55 to the trial court for signature and entry prior to May 16, 2006, in 
violation of Rule 7(2) URCP. 
In more than twenty years of practice Mr. Henshaw's counsel has never been 
involved in a case in which an order was submitted to a court for signature without some 
type of notice being given to the opposing counsel. Likewise, in more than twenty years 
of practice Mr. Henshaw's counsel has never been involved in a case in which a request 
to sign and enter a proposed order was not submitted to the opposing party at the time the 
proposed order was submitted to the trial court. Therefore, there was no reason why 
either Mr. Henshaw or his attorney would assume that the Kings had improperly and 
prematurely submitted "the Order5' to the trial court for signature and entry, in violation 
of the Rule 7(2) URCP, or that the trial court would improperly and prematurely sign and 
enter "the Order" in violation Rule 7(2) URCP. 
The trial court's finding that: "the plaintiffs produced no evidence demonstrating 
any efforts to learn about entry of the judgment, Therefore, the Court concludes that the 
plaintiffs were not diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment had been 
entered, " is tantamount to a ruling that parties to litigation must assume that opposing 
parties and their counsel will not comply with the URCP and that trial courts also will not 
comply with or enforce the URCP. Therefore, according to the trial court's ruling, 
attorneys must constantly monitor their cases to insure that the URCP are being properly 
applied and followed. 
Surely the practice of law in Utah has not disintegrated to the extent that parties to 
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litigation must assume that the URCP will regularly and routinely be ignored and that 
they must constantly check court files to assure that they are aware of every violation of 
the URCP. The trial court's finding that neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel were 
"diligent enough in trying to determine whether the judgment had been entered" is plain 
error and an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
2. The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial and Reversible Error. And Abused Its 
Discretion, In Concluding That The Only Evidence Mr. Henshaw Advance In An 
Attempt To Prove He Was Misled To Believe That The Judgment Had Been 
Entered In This Case Is Mr. Henshaw's Statement That The Kings Responded To 
His Objections To "The Order" Instead Of Notifying Him About Entry Of The 
Order And Judgment 
In denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion the trial court also made these 
additional findings: 
7. Based on these dates, the Court may only speculate whether the defendants 
counsel knew about entry of the judgment on 19 May 2006 when he signed and 
mailed the Reply 
8. The plaintiffs have produced no evidence to convince this Court that Counsel 
for the defendants had actual knowledge of the judgment and intentionally failed 
to notify the plaintiffs about it 
Those determinations are incorrect and constitute prejudicial and reversible error and an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP provides: The party preparing the order shall file the 
proposed order upon being served with an objection or the expiration of the time to 
object (Emphasis added). It does not contain any provision authorizing a response to 
objections to a proposed order. The only reason the Kings filed a response to Mr. 
Henshaw's objection to "the Order" was to prevent Mr. Henshaw and his attorney from 
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learning that "the Order" had been signed and entered. 
The Kings have not disputed that they knew "the Order" had been signed and 
entered. (Record 1191-1200). If the Kings truly did not know that "the Order" had been 
signed and entered, they would have so stated in response to Mr. Henshaw's assertion, 
contained in his Memorandum in Support of his Rule 60(b) Motion, that the Kings knew 
"the Order" had been signed and entered and failed to inform Mr. Henshaw of that fact 
for the express purpose of preventing him from appealing "the Order." If the Kings truly 
did not know that "the Order" had been entered, they would have stated that they would 
have not responded to Mr. Henshaw's objections to "the Order" if they knew that "the 
Order" had been entered. They did not do so. Again showing that they in fact knew "the 
Order" had been signed and entered. 
Any attorney or party accused of deliberately engaging in a scheme to prevent an 
opposing party from learning that an order had been entered would have denied that 
assertion and claimed that they did not know the order had been entered in a responding 
memorandum, if in fact they did not know that the order had been entered. The fact 
neither the Kings nor their counsel made such a claim, makes it clear that they in fact 
knew the order had both been signed and entered. 
Because the indisputable facts of this case clearly and unequivocally establish that 
the Kings both knew "the Order" had been signed and entered and that they deliberately 
engaged in a scheme to prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that "the Order" had been 
signed and entered, the trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error and abused 
its discretion when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
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3, Given The Procedurally History Of This Case, The Trial Court Committed 
Prejudicial And Reversible Error And Abused Its Discretion In Determining That 
Mr. Henshaw Was Not Diligent Enough In Determining Whether Or Not The 
Order On The Kings' Motion For A Directed Verdict Had Been Entered. 
Given the history of the time delays in receiving decisions on motions, objections 
and requests in this case, it was completely reasonable for Mr. Henshaw and his counsel 
to not expect a decision on his Objection to the Kings' proposed "the Order" for more 
than a month after it had been filed. The following is a partial history of the motions, 
requests and objections filed by the parties and the time it took to get a ruling on the 
various filings: 
1) The Henshaws filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 03/07/2002. 
The trial court did not address the Henshaws' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment until 
05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
2) The Henshaws filed a Motion to Strike the Sure-Reply of the Kings on 
04/06/2002 and a Motion to Compel that same day. Again the trial court did not address 
those Motions until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
3) The Henshaws filed a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions on 06/19/2002. That 
Motion was not ruled on until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
4) The Kings filed a motion to compel on 11/02/2002. That motion was not ruled 
upon until 05/08/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
5) The Henshaws filed a Motion to Reconsider on 05/08/2003. That motion was 
not ruled upon until 07/28/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
6) The Henshaws filed a request for a Clarification of Decision on 05/27/03. 
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That Request was not ruled upon until 08/05/2003. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
7) The Kings filed a motion to quash service on Bonnie King on 03/03 2004. 
That motion was not ruled upon until 04/28/2004. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
8) The Henshaws filed a Dismissal of claims on 05/08/2004. The Kings filed an 
objection to the Henshaws9 Dismissal of claims on 06/10/2004. That motion was not 
ruled upon until 08/03/2004. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
9) The Kings filed a motion to exclude witnesses and evidence on 12/27/2005. 
That motion was not ruled upon until 03/23/2006. See the Judgment Roll and Index. 
If all decisions in this case had been entered, immediately upon the expiration of 
the time to respond to such motions, objections or requests, then perhaps it could be said 
that Mr. Henshaw and his counsel were not diligent enough in attempting to determine if 
"the Order" had been entered. However, given the fact that the time to receive a decision 
on motions, objections and/or requests took from fourteen months on the Henshaws' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and almost always two to three months or more on 
other motions, objections and requests, it was not reasonable of logical for the trial court 
to determine that Mr. Henshaw and his counsel were not diligent enough in determining 
if "the Order" had been entered because neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel specifically 
inquired of the clerk of the trial court to see if perchance "the Order" had been entered 
sooner than a month after Mr. Henshaw filed his Objection to "the Order," especially 
when the neither Mr. Henshaw nor his counsel had any knowledge that "the Order" had 
been prematurely submitted to the trial court for signing and entry, in violation of Rule 
7(f)(2) URCP. 
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CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
the Kings' motion for a directed verdict. Under clear and controlling Utah law, the Kings 
had no standing to ask the trial court to rule that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in 
the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death. Therefore, this Court must 
reverse that part of "the Order" holding that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death. 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error and abused its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. The trial court prematurely and 
unlawfully entered "the Order" holding that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the 
water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death. The effect of the premature and 
unlawful entry is that Mr. Henshaw was denied his Constitutional right appeal the trial 
court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest in the water rights did not pass to 
Mildred upon his death. The trial court's ruling that Raymond Watrous' one-half interest 
in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death is plain error and, therefore 
must be reversed. 
The Kings deliberately engaged in a scheme to deny Mr. Henshaw his 
Constitutional and due process rights to appeal "the Order" because they knew that on 
appeal "the Order" would be reversed. The Kings should not be permitted to deny Mr. 
Henshaw his Constitutional and due process rights to appeal "the Order." 
The trial court improperly concluded that Mr. Henshaw was not diligent enough in 
attempting to learn if "the Order" had been entered. However, given the facts of this 
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case, including the Kings failure to notify Mr. Henshaw that "the Order" and been signed 
and entered or even that it had been submitted to the trial court for signature and entry, 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion, 
especially given the history of delays in obtaining rulings on motions, objections and 
requests in this case. 
Rule 1(a) URCP provides that the URCP "shall be liberally construed to secure 
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. " Given the indisputable 
facts of this case, the interest of justice, fairness and equity demand that Mr. Henshaw be 
afforded the opportunity to appeal that portion of "the Order" ruling that Raymond 
Watrous5 one-half interest in the water rights did not pass to Mildred upon his death, in 
order to insure that Mr. Henshaw5 s Constitutional and due process rights are protected 
and preserved and that he is guaranteed the same rights as other litigants. 
Wherefore, Mr. Henshaw respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's denial of Mr. Henshaw5s Rule 60(b) Motion and reverse that portion of "the 
Order,55 holding that Raymond Watrous5 one-half interest in the water rights did not pass 
to Mildred upon his death, in as much as that holding is plain error under clear and 
controlling Utah law. Mr. Henshaw also requests that he be awarded his appeal costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this appeal based on the fact that he was the 
prevailing party in the Kings quiet title claim. 
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Respectfully submitted this /r day of April 2007. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
I hereby certify that on the 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ay of April 2007,1 hand delivered two true 
and correct copes of the foregoing Brief to the person(s) at the address(es) below: 
David R. Williams 
WOODBURY AND KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 3358 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3358 
i S ^ ^ -
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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APPENDIX 
Rule4URAP: 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a 
matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered 
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by 
Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions. 
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for all 
parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the 
motion: 
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not an 
alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under Rule 52(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure; 
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; or 
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry 
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after 
entry of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective 
to appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of 
any motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice 
of appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the 
announcement of a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or 
order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other 
party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of 
appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of 
this rule, whichever period last expires. 
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(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or 
good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later 
than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the 
trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed 
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the 
trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from 
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing 
that a criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall 
reinstate the thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such 
reinstatement shall file a written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting 
entity. If the defendant is not represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. 
The prosecutor shall have 30 days after service of the motion to file a written response. If 
the prosecutor opposes the motion, the trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties 
may present evidence. If the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his right to appeal, it shall enter an 
order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of appeal must be filed with 
the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the order. 
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution 
files a notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely 
filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for 
filing. Timely filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting 
forth the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice 
of appeal is filed in the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period 
provided in paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial court receives the first notice 
of appeal 
Rule 1(a) URCP. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or 
in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules 
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. 
They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
Rule 6(a) URCP: 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, 
by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the 
day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run 
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shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it 
is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end 
of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of 
time prescribed or allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under 
subsection (e), is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays 
shall be excluded in the computation. 
Rule 6(e) URCP: 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party has the right or is required to 
do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon him and the notice or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 
days shall be added to the end of the prescribed period as calculated under subsection 
(a). Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be included in the computation of any 3-
day period under this subsection, except that if the last day of the 3-day period is a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, the period shall run until the end of the next day 
which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday. 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within 
fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in 
conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed order shall be filed 
within five days after service. The party preparing the order shall file the proposed order 
upon being served with an objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
Rule 58A(d) URCP: 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. A copy of the signed judgment shall be 
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for 
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision. 
Rule 59 URCP: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the 
court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct 
the entry of a new judgment: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of 
the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair 
trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been 
induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question 
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submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance or as a result of 
bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which 
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after 
the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under 
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit. Whenever a motion 
for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing 
party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time 
within which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its 
own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new 
trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall 
be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b) URCP: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
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within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken, A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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